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Abstract—This paper studies the role of political 
institutions in determining the political success of agriculture 
in avoiding taxation or attracting government transfers in 
developing and industrialized countries, respectively. The 
model is based on a probabilistic voting environment, where in 
industrialized countries rural districts are less ideologically 
committed than urban districts, while in developing countries 
urban districts are less ideologically committed than rural 
districts. As a consequence, in industrialized (developing) 
countries rural (urban) districts are pivotal in determining the 
coalition that obtains a majority, whereas urban (rural) 
districts are pivotal within the majority itself. In bargaining at 
the legislature, this generates a conflict between the 
government, who will tend to favor rural (urban) districts, and 
its parliamentary majority, that will be dominated by urban 
(rural) concerns. As district size grows and the electoral 
system converges to a pure proportional system, both of these 
biases are attenuated. Overall, an opposite nonlinear 
relationship between district size and agricultural subsidies on 
the one hand and district size and taxation on the other hand 
follows, i.e. in developing countries taxation of agriculture first 
increases and then decreases with district magnitude, while in 
industrialized countries agricultural subsidization first 
increases and then decreases with district magnitude. 
Moreover, the impact of district magnitude on the level of 
agricultural subsidization is attenuated in presidential when 
compared to parliamentary systems, while the level of 
agricultural taxation is amplified in presidential systems. 
Empirical results from cross-country analysis including 37 
countries over 20 years mainly support our theory. 
 
Keywords—Political Institutions, Agricultural 
Protection, Probabilistic Voting Model. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY1 
It has long been a well-established policy pattern 
that industrialized countries subsidize their agricultural 
sector, while developing countries tax this sector (Bale 
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and Lutz, 1981; Anderson, 1995; Krueger et al., 1988). 
Reducing the taxation of agriculture in developing 
countries was one of the goals of structural adjustment 
policies. Has the pattern of taxation and protection 
changed as a consequence? A recent multi-country 
study led by Anderson (2008) found that, on average, 
the anti-agricultural bias has indeed been reduced in 
most regions, but it still exists. Moreover, the anti-
trade bias of agricultural policies has remained. The 
study also found that, with economic development, 
some countries have switched from agricultural 
taxation to protection, rather than stopping at neutral 
policies (Anderson, 2008). This pattern of taxation-
protection switch has been characterized as a 
development paradox. Most existing political 
economy studies focus on classical public choice 
approaches (Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983; Krueger et 
al., 1988; Gardner, 1987; Swinnen, 1994; Tyers and 
Anderson, 1992; Miller, 1991; Zusman, 1976) to try to 
solve the puzzle why inefficient (biased) agricultural 
polices persist in both developing and industrialized 
countries, respectively. In particular, these studies 
understand agricultural policies as the results of 
political bargaining (competition) among various 
social groups for income/welfare redistribution. The 
final policy outcome is determined by both the relative 
political bargaining power of agrarian and non-
agrarian groups and the economically determined 
transformation of welfare among these groups. The 
higher the political bargaining power of a particular 
social group and the more favorable political welfare 
transformation towards this group the higher is c.p. the 
politically redistributed income towards this group in 
political economy equilibrium.  
Although various political economy approaches 
differ in their detailed modeling strategy, they 
basically highlight three components determining 
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agricultural protection levels in political economy 
equilibrium: (1) farmers’ cost of organization to 
overcome the free-rider problem inherent in collective 
political action, (2) the cost of income redistribution, 
i.e. deadweight costs, and (3) the relative income of 
rural and urban population. Accordingly, empirical 
studies mainly focus on various demographic and 
economic variables influencing both deadweight cost 
and cost of organization (Gardner, 1987; Tyers and 
Anderson, 1992; Anderson, 1995)  
Although the existing political economy models 
certainly contribute to our understanding of biased 
agricultural policies, they still leave some puzzles 
unsolved. In particular, they fail to explain the 
variation of agricultural protection levels across 
nations with relatively similar economic and 
demographic structures, e.g. variation of protection 
levels among industrialized countries on the one hand 
and among developing countries on the other hand.  
At the theoretical level, classical public choice 
models lack a micro political foundation of political 
behavior, i.e. these approaches model political 
decision making assuming a unitary political actor 
maximizing a given political preference, voter support, 
or influence function.  
In contrast to classical public choice, taking the 
political decision-making process as a black box, more 
recent new approaches focus on explicitly modeling 
the political decision-making process as an interaction 
between a set of individually rational political actors. 
Within these new political economy approaches, 
biased policies result as specific incentive problems, 
where political institutions are considered as key 
factors influencing individual incentives of political 
actors. Thus, in the light of these new approaches, 
beyond general economic factors determining 
deadweight costs and demographic factors 
determining cost of interest organization, political 
institutions are main factors in explaining observed 
variances of economic policies across countries 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2002). For example, Persson 
and Tabellini or Milesi- Ferretti et al. nicely 
demonstrate how the electorate system and the 
organization of legislature determine general 
macroeconomic policies (Persson and Tabellini, 2002; 
Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002). Nowadays it is commonly 
accepted that political institutions have a significant 
impact on policy outcome (Miller, 1997; Weingast et 
al., 1981; Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). Even 
international organizations such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund take governance 
criteria increasingly into account when granting 
financial aid.  
However, theoretical as well as empirical analyses 
of the political economy of agricultural policy, taking 
explicitly political institutions into account, are still 
rather rare (Beghin and Fafchamps, 1995). Only some 
recent analyses have attempted to cover this gap (for 
example, see Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Beghin et 
al., 1996; Olper, 2001; Swinnen et al., 2001; Henning, 
2004). Most of these studies analyze the general 
impact of democracy on agricultural protectionism, 
comparing agricultural protection levels in democratic 
and autocratic countries. Moreover, all of these studies 
apply a heuristic approach based on quasi-reduced 
form estimation, while they do not provide an explicit 
theory of how political institutions influence 
agricultural protection. An exemption is Henning and 
Struve (2007) who derived a theory in a probabilistic 
voting environment explaining the role of electoral 
rules on agricultural protection in parliamentary 
systems in industrialized countries2.  
Within this framework, the paper provides a further 
attempt to systematically analyze the impact of 
political institutions on agricultural policies at both the 
theoretical and empirical levels. In particular, the 
model of Henning and Struve (2007) explaining the 
role of electoral rules in agricultural protection in 
parliamentary systems of industrialized countries, is 
extended in two directions.  
First, the model is applied to the demographic and 
economic framework conditions of developing 
countries. Thus, while industrialized countries are 
characterized by a majority of urban population, 
developing countries are characterized by a majority 
of rural population.  
In detail, the voting model suggested by Henning 
and Struve (2007) is based on a probabilistic 
environment where in industrialized countries rural 
districts are less ideologically committed than urban 
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protection levels observed for the U.S. and EU by taking the 
different legislative organization of agricultural policy decision 
making under the U.S. and EU regime into account 
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districts. As a consequence, in parliamentary systems 
of industrialized countries rural districts are pivotal in 
determining the coalition that obtains a majority, 
whereas urban districts are pivotal within the majority 
itself. In bargaining at the legislature, this generate a 
conflict between the prime minister, who will tend to 
favor rural districts, and her parliamentary majority, 
that will be dominated by urban concerns.  
At the election stage, both the bias of the prime 
minister in favor of rural as well as the bias of its 
majority in favor of urban districts are attenuated, 
when district size grows and the electoral system 
converges to a pure proportional representation, since 
district populations become more homogenous. 
Overall, a nonlinear relationship between district size 
and agricultural protection follows: when the system is 
close to purely proportional, a decrease in district size 
increases agricultural subsidies, since it implies that 
the prime minister becomes more biased towards rural 
districts. As district size continues to decrease, urban 
legislators become less and less willing to support 
agricultural subsidies; at some point, this implies that 
despite party discipline they would be willing to break 
the coalition, and agricultural subsidies have to 
decrease in order to preserve unity.  
Applying this model to explain agricultural 
taxation in parliamentary systems of developing 
countries a corresponding inverse u-shape relation 
between district magnitude and the level of taxation 
results by exactly the same logic. This follows since in 
contrast to industrialized countries in developing 
countries urban districts are in the minority and less 
ideologically committed than rural districts. Hence, as 
a consequence in parliamentary systems of developing 
countries urban districts are pivotal in determining the 
coalition that obtains a majority, whereas rural 
districts are pivotal within the majority itself.  
Accordingly, in bargaining at the legislature, this 
generates a corresponding conflicts between the pro 
urban premier minister and its pro rural parliamentary 
majority. Following the same logic derived for 
industrialized countries, in parliamentary system of 
developing countries a non-linear relationship between 
district size and level of agricultural taxation results.  
However, these seemingly compatible results have 
major implications for cross-country analyses. In 
particular, our theoretical results apply a different 
regime explaining the influence of political institutions 
on agricultural protection for countries that tax 
agriculture when compared to countries that subsidize 
agriculture. Therefore, to confirm our theory applying 
a cross-country analyses including both developing 
and industrialized countries a switching regression 
model has to be used. To see this, note that measuring 
agricultural protection applying the usual concepts, 
e.g. PSE or NPC, it follows directly from our theory 
that an inverse u-shape relation between district 
magnitude and the PSE or NPC-measure results for 
(industrialized) countries subsidizing agriculture. In 
contrast, our theory implies a u-shape relation between 
district magnitude and the PSE or NPC measure for 
(developing) countries taxing agriculture. Therefore, 
estimating one equation for both regimes, agricultural 
taxation  and subsidization, respectively, will lead to 
biased results regarding the influence of political 
institutions on agricultural protection.  
The second extension we suggest corresponds to 
the analyses of the impact of the governmental system, 
i.e. parliamentary versus presidential system, on 
patterns of agricultural protection in developing and 
industrialized countries, respectively. In particular, we 
will extend the model of Henning and Struve (2007) to 
incorporate also presidential systems. In contrast to 
parliamentary systems, which are characterized by 
stable ex ante majorities and strong legislative 
cohesion granting the prime minister strong legislative 
power, legislative cohesion is rather small in 
presidential systems which in turn are characterized by 
agenda setting power of parliamentary committees. 
Therefore, we will demonstrate that legislative 
bargaining in presidential system is characterized by a 
conflict between the median of the agricultural 
committee, who will tend to favor rural (urban) district 
and the floor median, who tends to favor urban (rural) 
districts in industrialized (developing) countries, 
respectively.  
Again, at the election stage, both bias of the 
committee median in favor of rural as well as the bias 
of its floor median in favor of urban districts are 
attenuated, when district size grows and the electoral 
system converges to a pure proportional 
representation, since district populations become more 
homogenous. Overall, analogously to parliamentary 
systems also for presidential systems the same 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008   4 
nonlinear relationships between district size and 
agricultural protection and taxation follows for 
industrialized and developing countries, respectively. 
However, as long as agenda setting power of the 
agricultural committee is lower when compared to 
agenda setting power of the prime minister due to 
legislative cohesion in parliamentary systems, 
agricultural subsidization in industrialized countries 
should be lower for presidential systems, and by the 
same argument the level of agricultural taxation in 
developing countries should also c.p. be lower for 
presidential when compared to parliamentary systems. 
Moreover, our theory implies that the cut points of the 
nonlinear relationship will c.p. occur at a lower district 
magnitude. Finally, please note the our model also 
extents standard result of pre-election politics models 
implying that majoritarian election systems lead to 
higher target redistribution when compared to systems 
of proportional representation (Persson and Tabellini, 
2002). Note, that these models focus solely on the 
policy preferences of the party or government leader, 
neglecting postelection bargaining.  
In the empirical part of the paper we test our theory 
using cross country data. The data cover a period from 
1982 to 2003 and includes overall 37 countries, 13 
OECD countries, 4 CEEC and 20 developing 
countries.  
In particular, we apply a switching regression 
model to take into account for different protection 
regimes, agricultural taxation and subsidization, 
respectively. Moreover, following Beghin et al. (1996) 
we also apply a two-stage-least-square regression to 
take into account for a possible simultaneous equation 
bias when regressing agricultural protection on 
specific economic framework variables. Additionally, 
since we use cross-country time series data we also 
take possible correlations of error terms over time for 
the same country into account. To cope with the latter 
problem we apply a cluster-specific random effect 
model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).  
Estimation results mainly support our theory. In 
particular, we find a significant inverse u-shape 
relation between district magnitude and the PSE 
measure for the subsidy regime as well as a significant 
u-shape relation between district magnitude and the 
PSE measure for the tax regime.  
Regarding the impact of governmental system, we 
got mixed results. First, for both regimes, i.e. the tax 
and subsidy regime, we could identify a significant 
impact of the governmental system on agricultural 
protection. However, the direct effect and indirect 
effects resulting from the interaction with the district 
magnitude oppose each other. Thus, overall impact of 
governmental system depends on district magnitude. 
For majority like electoral systems a presidential 
regime leads to a higher subsidization and higher 
taxation when compared to parliamentary systems, 
while moving towards proportional representation, i.e. 
higher district magnitude, an opposite effect results.  
One explanation might be unobserved 
characteristics of governmental regimes. On the one 
hand parliamentary systems vary regarding rules 
determining legislative cohesion, e.g. detailed rules of 
government breakup and formation, that differ over 
countries. On the other hand, presidential systems vary 
regarding rules determining agenda setting power of 
the parliamentary committees, e.g. open and close 
rules. Moreover, presidential regimes might vary 
regarding formal and in particular informal rules 
granting legislative power to the president. Thus, 
further research is necessary to understand in more 
detail the role of governmental institutions and their 
interaction with electoral rules regarding the pattern of 
agricultural protection in developing and industrialized 
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